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In recent work about know how, Rylean regress arguments have largely dropped out
of focus. They play little role in the anti-intellectualist arguments of various kinds
in the papers collected in Bengson andMoffett (2011). They are used as something
like target practice by intellectualists like Jason Stanley (2011), who uses the first
chapter of his book to dispose of them before getting onto the real business. And
even Yuri Cath, who in other work has launched sharp critiques of intellectualism,
has argued that the regress arguments for anti-intellectualism don’t work (Cath,
2011, 2013). Themajority view seems to be that Carl Ginet (1975) basically showed
these arguments didn’t work, and it’s time to move onto other considerations for or
against intellectualism.
I think this isn’t exactly right. In particular, I think regress arguments can be
used to show a few different things. For one, they can be used to refute a precisifi-
cation of this thesis, which plays a key role in some intellectualist arguments.
 Only volitional actions are normatively assessable.
Once we have seen that thesis is false, we need a new picture of how action can be at
once intelligent and non-volitional. Some considerations similar to those adduced
by Ryle (1949) concerning agents who either concentrate on irrelevant considera-
tions, or ignore relevant ones, show there is a role for intellectual skill that cannot
be identified with any piece of knowledge that. And some further considerations,
similar to those adduced by Cath (2011), suggest that this intellectual skill can’t
even be constituted by a piece of knowledge that. So regress arguments, I’ll ar-
gue, can do quite a lot to motivate the thought that there was a lot wrong with the
intellectual picture Ryle tried to attack.
The position I’m going to be defending is a long way from the strongest kinds of
Rylean position that contemporary intellectualists such as Stanley are focussed on
arguing against. My focus is primarily on intellectual skill. This has some relevance
for debates about know how, though less relevance for debates about the semantics
of know how ascriptions. This focus on skill rather than know how ascriptions is
hardly novel; it is continuing a trend that we see exemplified in recent work by, inter
alia, Carlotta Pavese (2013), Ellen Fridland (2014) and Cheng-Hung Tsai (2014).
And in fact that conclusions I’ll draw here are, I think, similar to the ones that
Fridland draws.
Oncewemove towards thinking about skill, we can get varieties of anti-intellect-
ualism that are very different from those that were the focus of most philosophical
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discussion until very recently. For example, the anti-intellectualist view I’m defend-
ing is consistent with the following four theses.
 Instances of intellectual skill are usually, and perhaps always, not happily re-
ported using know how ascriptions.
 Know how ascriptions are rarely, if ever, reports of intellectual skill, and are
frequently reports of propositional knowledge.
 Intellectual skill is guided by, and dependent on, propositional knowledge.
 Propositional knowledge is not behaviourally inert.
Not just is the view consistent with these four, I’m fairly confident that the last
three at least are true. But that’s all consistent with the view that intellectual skill
is not itself propositional knowledge. And it’s all consistent with the view that we
can learn philosophically significant conclusions from Ryle’s regress arguments.
One disclaimer before I start. Although this paper is heavily influenced by Ryle
(1945, 1949), and sympathetic interpreters of Ryle such as JenniferHornsby (2011),
I make no attempt at Ryle exegesis here. I think there’s a decent case to be made
that Ryle was sympathetic to the position defended here, but I’m going to leave that
debate for another day.
1 The Volitional Regress
Define a volitional action to be one that is preceeded by a volition to perform that
very action. And say an action is normatively assessable if it can properly be as-
sessed using terms like praiseworthy, blameworthy, intelligent or stupid. Note that
I’m ruling out assessments as good or bad as versions of normative assessment, in
the relevant sense. Someone who has a good digestive system is not, thereby, nor-
matively assessable in the stipulative sense I’m using. Both of these definitions are
to an extent stipulative; the terms ‘volitional’ and ‘normative’ can sensibly receive
many other definitions. Still, I will stick to these definitions here. In light of those
stipulations, consider the following set of propositions.
1. Only volitional actions are normatively assessable.
2. The action of forming a volition is normatively assessable.
3. Some public actions, such as making a move in a chess game, are normatively
assessable.
It should be obvious that this leads to a regress. Whether the kind of regress in
question is impossible, or even impractical, is a tricky question. (See Robert K.
Meyer (1987) for some of the complications that arise when trying to reason about
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regresses.) But it is commonly assumed in this literature that the kind of regress
that these three premises lead to is problematic.
Since the third premise is obviously true, the issue is whether the first or second
is false. But it seems that second is true as well. Just as we can assess a person’s
actions as praise or blameworthy, intelligent or stupid, we can assess the process by
which she decided to perform those actions in the same way. Consider two people
who make the same, as it turns out great, chess move in the same situation. The
first notices an initially appealing counter to hermove, and sees after careful thought
that it won’t work. The second simply doesn’t notice the counter, and is stumped
when her opponent makes it. It seems the first has engaged in a more intelligent
practice of volition formation than the second. Or imagine a third player, whose
initial analysis of the move starts by considering a recipe for arroz con leche. Unless
there turns out to be an unnoticed connection here, this looks even less intelligent
than the second player.
On the other hand, the first premise is rather unintuitive. To borrow an example
from Angela Smith (2005), it is blameworthy to forget a friend’s birthday, although
forgettings are rarely volitional. So we must reject 1 or 2, and while 1 is subject
to independent counterexample, 2 seems independently plausible. So 1 must be
false.1
That’s already a substantial conclusion. Something like 1 is behind William
Alston’s famous, and influential, arguments against deontological approaches to
epistemology (Alston, 1988). But the negation of 1 is not a novel claim; I’m say-
ing nothing here that Smith didn’t say in her rejection of the “volitional view of
responsibility” (Smith, 2005, 238). And similar views have been put forward by
other critics of Alston such as Sharon Ryan (2003) and Matthias Steup (2008).
But still, the fact that 1 is false seems not to have been sufficiently appreciated
in the recent literature on intellectualism. To see one place where it is relevant,
consider this set of propositions, which also seem to trigger a regress.
4. Intelligent action requires the triggering of a prior representation of knowl-
edge relevant to the action.
5. The triggering of a representation, when done well, is an intelligent action.
6. Some public actions, such as making a move in a chess game, are intelligent.
Again, these propositions obviously trigger a regress, and that seems like good ev-
idence to take one of them to be false. This is very similar to one of the regresses
Jason Stanley considers in chapter 2 of his (2011). And Stanley thinks the false
1This argument is obviously rather quick, and I doubt will persuade someone already convinced
of 1. For much more extensive arguments against 1, see the Smith, Ryan and Steup articles cited in
the text, plus Adams (1985).
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proposition is 5. He writes “Triggering a representation can be done poorly or well.
But this does not show it can be done intelligently or stupidly.” (Stanley, 2011,
16) Indeed, he writes that since “triggering representations is something we do au-
tomatically” (Stanley, 2011, 16) a statement like 5 is a “manifest implausibility”
(Stanley, 2011, 16). But the argument here relies on 1. If you think things done
non-volitionally can be intelligent or stupid, it isn’t too much of a stretch to think
that things done automatically can be intelligent or stupid. Indeed, Smith’s birth-
day example is already enough to undermine Stanley’s point; forgetting a friend’s
birthday seems automatic in the sense he has in mind, but is also stupid.
More generally, it seems very intuitive to describe everyday cases in such a way
that 5 must be true. For example, Billy asks Suzy whether she thinks Jill’s party will
be a success. There are a lot of things that are common knowledge between the two
of them. One is that Jill is a proficient party host. Another is that Jill has invited
all of their colleagues, including Jack. Another is that parties which Jack attends
are rarely successes. But Suzy thinks for a minute, remembers that Jack is away in
Ohio, and says that it will be a success.
It was smart of Suzy to think about Jack’s whereabouts. It wasn’t, perhaps,
necessary. If she’d just reasoned from Jill’s general proficiency to the success of the
party, she would have got to the right conclusion. But it was better to note a possible
complication, and check that it wouldn’t actually get in the way.
It would have been stupid to perform the same activity for many other kinds of
possible complications. If Suzy had thought to herself, “The party will be a disaster
if there’s an alien invasion in the middle of it, but there’s no reason to think the
aliens will invade just now, so I’ll keep on thinking it will be a success,” that would
have been stupid. Other possible complications are not stupid to consider, but they
are intellectual mistakes. The party won’t be a success if there’s a police raid in the
middle, based on a mistaken view the police have about where a particular drug
dealer lives. Police do make mistakes, so even if Jill isn’t a drug dealer, this could be
a genuine concern, depending on how nearby the mistakes are. But if the nearest
mistake was a botched raid in a neighbouring state in the previous year, it’s wrong
for Suzy to worry about this before answering Billy’s question.
Stanley’s view has to be that I’ve beenmisusing adjectives systematically through
the last two paragraphs. I shouldn’t have said that it was smart of Suzy to consider
Jack’s whereabouts, or that it would have been stupid to consider the alien invasion.
Rather, it was just her cognitive system working well when she considered Jack, and
would have been working poorly had she considered the aliens, and sub-optimally
had she considered the police. This doesn’t seem at all the natural way to describe
the case to me, in part because I’m not sure I see the difference Stanley is hinting
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at. Intelligence just is the good operation of the cognitive system, and stupidity its
poor operation.
So these two regresses lead to two interesting conclusions. First, some non-
volitional actions are normatively assessable. Second, intelligent action does not
always require the prior triggering of a representation of relevant knowledge. Both
of these are interesting. Both of these are negations of part of what you might
consider “the intellectualist picture”. (Cath (2013) notes that Ryle often refers to
the regresses as arguments against this picture, not against any particular thesis.)
But neither of them get us very close to a distinction between know how and know
that, or between intellectual skill and know that. The next section addresses some
ways we might move closer to arguments against more central intellectualist claims.
2 Picturing Intelligent Action
As noted in the introduction, my plan is not to offer an argument with regress like
premises, and the conclusion that intellectual skill is distinct from propositional
knowledge, or that know how is distinct from propositional knowledge. What I
do want to do is sketch a picture of human intelligence (at a very high level of
generality) that presupposes that intellectual skill is not identical to propositional
knowledge, and suggest some considerations to the effect that no similarly plausible
picture exists in which intellectual skill and propositional knowledge are identified.
The thought here is not that the only way out of the regress involves distinguishing
skill and knowledge – and perhaps distinguishing know how from know that – but
rather that the best way out does.
Start with a well known, if not obviously authentic, exchange.2
Oscar Wilde: I wish I’d said that.
James McNeill Whistler: You will Oscar; you will.
Assuming this really happened, that’s a clever response. It’s an occupational hazard
of philosophers to think that the ability to come up with quick, clever responses
is somehow central to intelligence. But we can reject that wildly implausible view
without thinking that it’s wrong to think of these quips as a manifestation of a kind
of intelligence.
2I thought this example was purely fictional, coming from the Monty Python sketch reproduced
in Dempsey (2012, p. 741). But Ben Wolfson pointed out to me that it’s recorded as a true story in
Hadley (1903, p. 255).
It’s actually striking how few really good off-the-cuff quips there are in recorded history. The
famous one attributed to Wilde, “I have nothing to declare but my genius”, is probably apocryphal,
and in any case sounds prepared. Lists of famous come-backs and ripostes are usually crowded with
written responses. Word play is hard.
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Now let’s think of how someone could have come up with this response. Even
before we start researching the neural patterns behind quips like this, we can be
pretty sure the following is not what happened in Whistler’s brain. He first made
an exhaustive list of all possible responses, from “Green ideas sleep furiously” to
what he actually said, then figured out which would be best, then produced the best
one. On this wildly implausible model, the reply would be intelligent because it
would reflect the speaker’s ability to properly evaluate this list of responses. That’s
implausible because the list is simply too big. Indeed, it is in principle infinitely
large. The list is too big to survey not just consciously, but subconsciously.
Coming up with a response like this requires first coming up with a narrower
list of possible responses, and then evaluating which is best from that list.3 There’s
a romantic model of intellect where the list in question consists of just the reply
actually issued. On this model the perfect reply appears fully and perfectly formed
in the mind of the intelligent person. Now such a model may often fit the phe-
nomenology, but I don’t think we should give that much credit. It’s an empirical
question how many possible replies are represented in the mind in a situation like
this, before the chosen reply is issued. What’s not an empirical issue is whether the
list of possible replies that is represented in the mind is finite or infinite. It simply
must be finite, which means that there must be better and worse lists to consider.
And that suggests that there is some skill involved in coming up with the list.
One could reject this last conclusion. One could try saying that the coming
up with a list of possible replies is no manifestation of skill, but the skill is only
involved in the evaluation and selection of replies. But this seems to generate a
bizarre explanation about why the less skilled interlocutor comes up with worse
replies. The model, presumably, is that the lack of skill does not explain having the
wrong list of replies to choose between. Rather, what explains their less skilled reply
must simply be that they misevaluated the possible replies. But that doesn’t fit the
observed data. It’s much easier to see of someone else’s reply that it was clever than
it is to come up with a clever reply.
It could also be objected that the model I’ve suggested is much too simple. It
isn’t just that the mind issues a list of options, then evaluates them, and then selects
the best. A more plausible model involves more recursive steps. The mind first
generates a list of options, selects the best, then generates a list of refinements of
that best option, selects the best of those, and so on. Perhaps when we consider
superficial forms of intelligence, such as quips, it makes sense to consider a ‘one-
step’ model, where a list is generated and evaluated, followed by a speech. But when
3Or, perhaps even more plausibly, coming up with a short list of possible openings, choosing the
best, and doing what one can to figure out how to complete the response while uttering the start of
it. Thanks here to Ben Wolfson.
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one is choosing one’s words carefully, as in say Wilde’s writing, the simple model
I’ve described feels much too simple.
But although the simple model is too simple for considered writing, the gen-
eral structure must be right. Even a writer working at a leisurely pace, such as Joyce
taking decades to write Finnegans Wake, doesn’t have time to consider, even sub-
consciously, all possible constructions. There are still too many. And nor is it true
that the difference between Joyce’s skill and ours is that he realises the value of the
sentences we all represent. The rest of us didn’t simply misjudge the value of “No-
birdy aviar soar anywing to eagle it” (Joyce, 1939/2012, p. 505); we simply didn’t
token it. The ability to token mental representations like that is part of what Joyce’s
genius consists in.
I’ve focussed so far on cases where it is a priori implausible that human thinkers
start by surveying the range of possible things they could do. It is also interesting
to look at cases where this is in principle possible, but doesn’t seem to happen in
practice. There have been, traditionally, major differences in the style of play be-
tween human and computer chess players. (Since so many young players learn from
machines these days, Kasparov (2010) suggests these differences are diminishing.4)
This isn’t necessarily because humans can’t consider all options on the chess board.
Usually there will be fewer than a hundred available moves, and a human could con-
sider each. But that isn’t, it seems, how humans think. They don’t allocate equal
resources to working through each of the possible options. As a result, computers
often come up with surprising kinds of moves. Now computers are actually very
good at chess, so these pre-deliberative allocations of cognitive resources may not
have been optimal. Perhaps it would have been better for traditional chess play-
ers to spend more time thinking through unlikely progressions of the game. But
it is evidence that even when we could use an unintelligent method for beginning
inquiry, namely recursively generating the possible options, we prefer to use intel-
ligent methods.
So intelligent action, at least in humans in the kinds of situations humans nor-
mally find themselves in, consists in part of making intelligent choices about where
to start inquiry. Given that intelligent action need not be volitional, as we estab-
lished above, it isn’t surprising that being intelligent consists in part in starting in
the right places. But perhaps this intelligence is just itself a kind of knowledge. It
is, we might suspect, just the knowledge of what a good starting point will be. Or,
since we will want to start with all and only the considerations relevant to a given
inquiry, it is just knowledge of what is relevant.
The resulting picture is both perfectly intellectualist, and immune to the re-
gresses considered above. The intelligent person knows what is relevant to what
4Thanks to Bernard Kobes and John Collins for helpful discussions about the chess examples.
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inquiry. Her choice of starting points is guided by this knowledge. (The ‘guidance’
metaphor recurs frequently in Stanley’s work.) This isn’t because it leads to a voli-
tion to start just here. Such a volition would be self-defeating, since in the relevant
sense of ‘start’, by the time this volition is formed, one has already started, and in-
deed started elsewhere. Nor can she be guided by even a triggered representation
of this knowledge of relevance. Again, if that happens, she is in the relevant sense
starting elsewhere. But perhaps propositional knowledge can guide directly; not by
generating volitions, and without even being represented anew.
Now I don’t think this picture is right. But it isn’t incoherent either, and it takes
work to see why it isn’t right.
One bad argument against this picture starts with the idea that skills are active,
while knowledge is passive. The thought is that the person who knows a lot is
like the Tortoise in Louis Carroll’s dialogue (Carroll, 1895), only able to add more
premises but never to reach a conclusion. It is only with skill that we can get to the
conclusion. Stanley rightly objects to this argument on the grounds that it just isn’t
true that knowledge is passive in the relevant sense. We should not, as Stanley puts
it, “over-intellectualize knowing that”. (Stanley, 2012, p. 773). (A similar point is
made in Stalnaker (2012).) Knowing that p is not just a matter of having p written
in a knowledge box somewhere in the brain; it can in part be constituted by active
dispositions.
A better argument looks at the very different modal profiles of intellectual skill
and knowledge of relevance. Someone can know that something is irrelevant and
yet lack the skill to ignore it; or they can know that something is relevant and yet
lack the skill to consider it in a timely manner. Examples from the other direction,
where there is skill without knowledge, are a little more contentious, but we’ll look
at some possible cases of those too. But first we’ll run through two examples to
show how easy it is to have knowledge without skill.
Alice has spent a lot of money on video-conferencing equipment. But it isn’t
working at all well, and she now has to decide whether to try and patch it into
something better, or buy a whole new system. She knows the sunk cost fallacy is
a fallacy; that buying a new system would make the previous purchases a waste is
no reason to not buy a new system, especially if doing so is good value compared
to the cost of buying a ‘patch’. But she can’t bring herself to ignore this fact when
deliberating. Even though she eventually makes the right decision and buys new
equipment, she takesmuch longer about this than she would have if, say, the existing
equipment was old enough that she could easily conceptualise it as obsolete.
Bob is trying to solve a puzzle about the properties of functions from rationals to
rationals. He knows that it is often helpful, when solving such puzzles, to transform
the puzzle into one about functions from ordered pairs of integers to ordered pairs
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of integers. He knows that in the sense that if you asked him whether it could be
useful to consider that transformation of the puzzle, he would immediately say yes,
and this answer would come with the phenemenology of recollection, not of new
insight. But no one does ask him that question, and the transformation in question
simply never occurs to Bob. Since the untransformed puzzle is very hard, while the
transformed puzzle is manageable, Bob never solves the problem.
It seems to me that what’s happened in both cases is that the agent has some
knowledge, but is incapable of using it. What they lack is a skill. In particular, they
lack what Fridland (2014, 2746) calls ‘selective, top-down, automatic attention’.
Alice keeps attending to something she should not, even though she knows she
should not. Bob fails to attend to something he should, although in some sense he
knows that is what he should attend to. Bob’s case is one of the reasons I find the
picture of skill presented by Stanley andWilliamson (forthcoming) unhelpful. They
say skill is a disposition to form knowledge. But Bob has the important knowledge.
The disposition he lacks is the disposition to activate that knowledge, and let it
guide deliberation. That’s what constitutes his lack of skill.
It’s true that knowledge isn’t completely passive. If Alice never appealed to the
fact that the sunk cost fallacy is a fallacy in her reasoning, we wouldn’t say that she
knows it. If none of Bob’s answers were guided by the existence of natural and
useful transformations between rational numbers and ordered pairs of integers, we
wouldn’t say he knows such transformations are natural and useful. I’m here agree-
ing with Stanley and Stalnaker that knowledge is itself a kind of disposition. And
intellectual skill is a kind of disposition too. But they are very different dispositions.
In particular, they have very different triggering conditions. Bob lacks some skill
because he does not call to mind this fact about rational numbers right now. He
has the salient knowledge about rational numbers because he is disposed to use the
facts in question often enough.
So intellectual skill and knowledge of relevance have different manifestation
conditions, and so they are not identical. But we can say something stronger than
that. The cases of Alice and Bob are not in any way unusual. Examples where we
forget the salience of some consideration, or can’t get an irrelevant point out of our
heads, are frequent. In principle, one could respond to the arguments I’ve made so
far by saying that while knowledge of relevance is not identical to skill, nevertheless
the two are as closely linked as, say, a material object and the matter that consti-
tutes it. And if I had to resort to bizarre cases of the kind we torture introductory
students with to make my point, I’d say that would be the right response. But given
how normal Alice and Bob’s cases are, this seems like the wrong move. Skill and
knowledge don’t just come apart in theory, they come apart in practice, frequently.
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3 Four Objections
So far I’ve defended three theses that are in tension with some forms of intellectu-
alism. They are:
 Some non-volitional actions are normatively assessable.
 Not all intelligent action is preceded by the triggering of representations of
relevant knowledge.
 Intellectual skill, in particular the intellectual skill associated with starting in-
quiry in the right place, is not identical to any piece of propositional knowl-
edge.
While this doesn’t show that, for instance, know how and know that are distinct,
and is completely silent on what we should say about know how ascriptions, it does
undermine some intellectualist programs. I’ll conclude with some objections either
to the arguments I’ve put forward, or to their significance.
Objection: Even if all of this is true, there may still be a sense in which intellec-
tualism is true. After all, it could still be that knowledge guides action in a suitable
way. (Compare (Stanley, 2011, p. 2).)
Reply: This could be true. Whether it is a win for intellectualism depends a bit
on the boring question of how we settle the term ‘intellectualism’, and a bit on more
interesting questions about priority. Let’s start by distinguishing five theories we
might call intellectualist.
Identity Intellectualism - The possession of an intellectual skill just is the posses-
sion of a piece of knowledge.
Constitution Intellectualism - The possession of an intellectual skill is, always,
constituted by a piece of knowledge.
Weak Constitution Intellectualism - The possession of an intellectual skill is, of-
ten, constituted by a piece of knowledge.
Causal Intellectualism -The possession of an intellectual skill is, always, caused by
the possession of a piece of knowledge.
Weak Causal Intellectualism -The possession of an intellectual skill is, often, caus-
ed by the possession of a piece of knowledge.
This paper has been arguing against Identity Intellectualism. I think the falsity of
this is as much as we could reasonably hope to prove using regress arguments. (I
think I’m here agreeing with Wiggins (2009) and Hornsby (2011).) And the con-
siderations behind the regress argument do, I think, show it to be false. If someone
wants to insist that by intellectualism, they mean something weaker than this, I’m
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not going to quarrel over terminology. I’ll just note that Identity Intellectualism is
an interesting, and false, thesis.
The arguments here are clearly not arguments against either form of Weak In-
tellectualism. Indeed, they are naturally understood as the kind of cases that con-
firm Weak Intellectualism. Mathematics students, like Bob, train by learning a lot
of mathematical facts. And it’s hard to see how they could develop the relevant
skills without knowing some important facts. This is, I suspect, the general case.
Skillfully bringing the right considerations to bear on a problem requires, and is
probably the causal consequence of, knowing a lot of relevant facts. (Tsai (2014)
makes clear how one can simultaneously hold that skills are in part constituted by
knowledge of facts without having an intellectualist picture of skill.)
But what of the other two intellectualist theories? Do we have reason to think
that there are some skills that are not constituted by, or not caused by, the possession
of factual knowledge? One way to quickly show that would be to show that there
can be skills without the related knowledge. Perhaps that’s not just sufficient for
rejecting Constitutive/Causal Intellectualism, but necessary. If knowledge without
skills is possible, as in Alice and Bob’s cases, and skills without knowledge were
impossible, that asymmetry would call out for explanation. And something in the
vicinity of Constitutive or Causal Intellectualism would be a very good candidate
explanation.
There are (at least) two promising routes to showing that there can be skills
without knowledge. One is due to Imogen Dickie (2012). She argues that since
there are so many different routes to skill than there are to knowledge, we should
expect that there will be cases of skill that are causally prior to knowledge. Jason
Stanley (2012) replies that Dickie’s argument assumes an overly narrow conception
of propositional knowledge. This is a fascinating debate, but I don’t have anything
useful to add to it, so I’ll just note the existence of this route, and move on.
The other route is due to Yuri Cath (2011). He suggests that facts in virtue
of which a person might lose propositional knowledge do not always bring about
a loss of knowledge that. I’m going to sketch a Cath-style argument that we can
have intellectual skills without knowledge. I think the argument has some force,
though there are more ways to resist it than there are to resist the argument against
Identity Intellectualism.
Ross and Rachel are economics students taking an exam. They are given a hard
question asking about the likely effects of an exogenous shock, say an earthquake
affecting an area the supplies crucial raw materials, on some related markets. The
question is hard, with the relevant causal pathways being interconnected and often
opposing. The only plausible way forward is to use a model and search for equilib-
rium points in themodel. That’s what Ross and Rachel have both been taught to do.
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And in fact both of them quickly select the right kind of model, with just the right
amount of complexity in it to answer the question without being overburdened, and
set out on the difficult algebra involved in solving the question.
So far it looks like both Ross and Rachel have shown intellectual skill. Now
it turns out Ross and Rachel have very different views about the role of models in
economic thinking. (My own thinking about models has been heavily influenced
by (Strevens, 2008, ch. 8) and Davey (2011), and I rely on their insights in what
follows.) These models involve, as all models do, some serious idealisation. Most
notably, they assume that all the relevant actors are perfectly rational utility max-
imisers. Rachel hasn’t given much thought to this assumption, though she knows
it to be literally false. But if pressed, she would say some reasonably sensible things
about why she was using the model. For one thing, the familiar failures of human
rationality aren’t obviously relevant to the puzzle being presented. For another,
they’ve been taught that using these models is a good way to solve problems, and
that testimonial evidence carries some weight. And for another, it’s an exam, and it
is likely that questions have been selected to test howwell students can use themod-
els they have been taught. If those are her background, implicit, views, I think it is
plausible to say that Rachel knows that the model is relevant to the exam question,
even if she couldn’t produce a theory of idealisations in economics of the standards
of the best philosophers.
Ross’s views about models are rather different. He thinks the familiar models
in economics work, when they do, because the background assumptions are strictly
and literally true. He thinks economic agents are utility maximisers, and the ap-
parent evidence to the contrary is due to sloppy experimental design. He thinks
markets are always in general equilibrium. And so he thinks that the only sources
of error in predictions we can make about markets are from errors about things like
the costs of extracting raw materials after the earthquake. This perspective is, of
course, grossly mistaken. Moreover, Ross thinks that if the assumptions were not
correct, there would be no point in using the models. This too is a mistake, though
perhaps not as dramatic as his other mistakes.
Now even if Ross and Rachel aren’t thinking about these philosophical views
about the nature of models, I think they are relevant to whether each of them know
that the models are relevant to the puzzle. In particular, I think Rachel does know
that the models are relevant, while Ross’s belief that they are relevant is more like
a lucky guess than a piece of knowledge. Still, I think we should say that Ross
showed skill in using this model rather than a more or less complex model, or a
different kind of model, or no model at all. So he is a case of intellectual skill
without knowledge of relevance.
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I don’t think this case is conclusive. I can think of at least four ways someone
might reasonably object to the case.
1. It might be argued that despite his false views about why the models are rel-
evant, he really does know that they are relevant. In other words, we would
have another counterexample, to be added to those discussed by Warfield
(2005) and Luzzi (2010), to the theory that false beliefs cannot generate
knowledge.
2. It might be argued that Ross is not really skilled, since it is a matter of luck
that the falsity of his beliefs does not lead him to false conclusions here.
3. It might be argued that although Ross doesn’t know that this model is rele-
vant, his skill is constituted by, or caused by, some other knowledge he has.
4. It might be argued that the broad picture of the role of idealisations in scien-
tific reasoning that I’m adopting from Strevens and Davey is mistaken, and
this fatally undermines my use of the case to argue against intellectualism.
I don’t think these arguments are going to ultimately work. But it’s clear we
are a long way from Rylean regress arguments here. And that’s where I think the
debate about regress arguments should end. We have a good argument against
Identity Intellectualism. And we have some suggestive considerations that seem to
tell against Constitutive and Causal Intellectualism, but whether these arguments
ultimately work will depend on considerations independent of the regress.
Objection: Stanley and Williamson (forthcoming) have recently defended the
idea that skill is a disposition to form knowledge. And they back this up with
empirical analysis of intelligent motor skills, especially drawing on the survey by
Yarrow et al. (2009). Is this kind of intellectualism subject to the regress worries?
Reply: Once we are taking the dispositions themselves to be the skills, not the
underlying knowledge, it feels that we are a long way from traditional intellectual-
ism. But the view is independently interesting, and it is a useful segue to thinking
about the relationship between intellectual skills, as conceived of in this paper, and
motor skills.
I’ve alreadymentioned that the Bob example does not seem to fit well with Stan-
ley and Williamson’s paradigm. And there is something suspicious about a theory
of physical skill that divorces it so strongly from the physical. To be a skilled bats-
man requires more than dispositions to get knowledge, one might suspect. Stanley
and Williamson have a reply to this suspicion. They write,
Consider the difference between someone who can bench-press a max-
imum of 100 pounds and someone who can bench press 150 pounds.
We may suppose that both employ the same technique; only brute
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strength makes the difference between them. Both are equally skilled
...Any view of skill must account for such cases. In particular, it must
explain why strength, speed, and stamina are not themselves skills.(Stanley
and Williamson, forthcoming, 9, page references to preprint)
But even if strength is not a skill, it might be a prerequisite for a skill. A bats-
man whose degenerative back condition means he lacks the flexibility to deploy his
trademark pull shot has lost a skill, even if he hasn’t lost any dispositions to form
knowledge. There is a puzzle as to why qualitative physical differences matter so
much to skill attributions why quantitative ones do not. If you can’t turn to pull the
ball, you’ve lost a skill, but if a muscle strength decline reduces the power of your
pull shot, your skills haven’t declined. But that difference doesn’t justify making
skills entirely cognitive.
Still, there is a cognitive angle. One central point of this paper is completely
consistent with Stanley andWilliamson’s picture; motor skills often require forming
the right knowledge. The skilled batsman doesn’t just pick up many characteristics
of the bowler’s delivery, they pick up the ones that are most relevant to the trajectory
of the ball. As the Bob example shows, they also have to activate that knowledge
for it really to be a skill, but that’s not a new objection.
There is one other cognitive aspect of motor skill that Yarrow et al. (2009) draw
attention to, and which fits very nicely with the theme of this paper. It’s a specific
instance of a much more wide-ranging skill. Sometimes an agent knows that in
some time some evidence, drawn from a large space, will come in. She will shortly
thereafter have to act in response to the evidence. She has some time to plan now.
What should she do? In many such cases, backwards induction is impossible; there
are toomany possible pieces of evidence that could come in, and planning for each of
them is a waste of resources. On the other hand, not planning at all is also a waste of
the time she now has, and will lack once the evidence comes in. The solution is to do
some planning. And there is a real skill involved in getting the resource allocation
right, and neither wasting effort planning for unlikely scenarios, nor wasting the
ability to be prepared before one needs to act.
Yarrow et al. (2009, 590-1) suggest the same thing happens at a very low level.
Highly skilled athletes are making many places in advance of knowing exactly how
they will act. Part of the skill involved is allocating the right resources to each of
these planning activities. Many of them will ultimately be wasteful, since they are
plans for eventualities that do not arise. And one failure condition is that a single
plan is not selected, and the agent performs some combination of multiple plans
that are worse than either one plan. That failure state is part of the evidence that
there is this low-level planning going on before actions. But it is a real skill, and
part of the skill is focussing on just the right things.
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So motor skills often have as a constituent part intellectual skills. Some of those
skills are closely tied to knowledge; for instance, having priors that track frequen-
cies. Sometimes the skill involved is in focussing on the evidence that the posterior
probability is maximally sensitive to, and reacting to that evidence. Sometimes the
skill is not attending to evidence that is just going to be unhelpful noise in the activ-
ity in question (Yarrow et al., 2009, 589). And sometimes it is in allocating just the
right resources to forward planning. All of these seem like intellectual skills, and
parts of motor skills. We could try to squeeze all of them into a framework of being
dispositions to form knowledge, but it seems more perspicuous to just present the
plurality of ways in which the intellect and the body interact, rather than trying to
find a single framework.
Objection: Appeal to skill does not stop the regress. If we need to posit some-
thing, say a skill, that comes between the possession of knowledge and the use
of knowledge in reasoning or action, then we also to posit something that comes
between the possession of a skill, and the use of that skill in reasoning or action.
(Compare (Stanley, 2011, p. 26)).
Reply: What I’m going to say here is similar to what Jeremy Fantl (2011) said
in a response to an earlier version of Stanley’s argument, so I’ll be brief. Skills are
dispositions. We don’t need to posit anything that comes between the disposition
and its triggering. If a string is disposed to produce a middle C when struck, and it
is struck, we don’t need to posit an extra intermediary between the striking and the
note. Dispositions stop regresses.
But, you might insist, couldn’t the same be true of knowledge? After all, on a
broadly functionalist construal of the mental, knowledge is a kind of disposition.
My reply is in theory knowledge could stop such a regress, but in practice it is
unlikely. An agent could be facing a problem where the possible considerations
and options can be enumerated without using any particular skill, and the options
are few enough that they can be each considered in turn. That is the situation an
agent playing a relatively simple game might face. But it isn’t the general human
condition. In practice, we face problems every moment where it requires skill to
bring the right considerations to bear, at least given the processing capacities we
have available.
Objection: There are semantic arguments that attributions of know how are at-
tributions of propositional knowledge. This shows that Ryle was wrong to draw a
broad distinction between know how and know that.
Reply: I’m not making any claims about either know how or about ‘know how’.
I ammaking some claims about skill, and those imply some claims about ‘skill’. But
I’m sympathetic to the idea that reports of know how are often reports of some kind
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of practical propositional knowledge. I certainly haven’t offered any arguments, nor
I think any considerations in the direction of an argument, against this view.
Indeed, there are a lot of intellectualst positions that I’m not arguing against
here. Anti-intellectualism is often tied up with the view that there is an important
distinction between theoretical and practical fields. The arguments I’ve developed
here suggest that if there is such a distinction, then proving mathematical theorems
is on the ‘practical’ side. I think that’s a strange enough conclusion that it is time
to change our terminology. That’s why I’ve talked about the distinction between
intellectual skills and knowledge, not the distinction (if such there is) between know
how and know that, or between praxis and theory.
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